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Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of framing strategy deployed in public discourse across two 
leading daily mass news media in the neoliberal economy of Ireland, during the Global Financial Cri-
sis. Framing is a technique for shaping perceptions of an event by discursively constructing it in  
elsewhere, 
n-
avoidable necessity, making opposition to the policy appear irrational. However, a successful framing 
strategy is one which is most applicable 
political economy. This study finds that Irish Government actors strategically favoured a second 
ame policy 
strategy is driven by local political economic considerations, namely that many politically-connected 
financial institutions that received 
would have foregrounded this fact, making opposition more likely. Thus, this study highlights that 
successful framing strategies must adapt to local socio-spatial conditions of applicability. 
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 The Global Financial Crisis represented an existential challenge to neoliberal 
orthodoxy due to the widespread failure of self-regulating markets, leading some 
analysts to suggest the neoliberal era was finished (Altvater 2009; Bresser-Pereira 
2010). The threat of financial implosion led national governments to spend billions of 
dollars propping up their collapsing financial sectors. This solution posed a serious 
challenge to the legitimacy of neoliberal ideology, which argues that a self-regulating 
market with minimal state intervention is the most efficient way to manage the econ-
omy (Friedman 1962). Paradoxically, the need for massive state intervention to save 
neoliberal finance capital has failed to discredit neoliberal policy globally (Crouch 
2011), and a return to something of a pre-crisis status-quo has been achieved by 
a resilient neoliberal order (Gamble 2014: 5). This begs the question of how has such 
resilience has been achieved. 
This study argues that discourse has played a significant role in strategically 
e-
gemony. As R-M. Fairclough (2010: 13) notes, a crisis in capitalism is always in part a 
crisis in its discourse. Consequently, past neoliberal crises such as the Latin America 
debt defaults and the Asian financial crisis have been strategically managed by way 
justments in neoliberal governance, discourse, and strate-
strategy. During the Global Financial Crisis public discourse was significantly 
shaped by the framing of fina
(1993: 52) argues that framing involves making some aspects of a perceived reality 
more visible than others within a communicating text in order to promote a particu-
lar understanding of an issue and its solution. Framing financial institutions as either 
 
make a contingent bailout policy appear as unavoidable. 
While there have been studies of media discourses concerned with neoliberal 
attempts to rehabilitate free-
recent failure during the Global Financial Crisis (see Chakravartty, Schiller, 2010; 




public discourse. Starting from the logical premise that bank bailouts are a political 
choice, not a necessity, this research aims to begin filling this lacuna, by taking Ire-
 case study for analysing public 
crisis discourse in the Irish mass media. Drawing methodologically upon critical dis-
course analysis (Fairclough 2010), this study conducts a qualitative content analysis 
Irish Independent and the Irish 
Times cial crisis during 
2008/2009, when the incumbent Fianna Fail-led government argued for the necessity 
of bailing out various financial institutions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section briefly traces the Irish econo-
economy as a distinct sociospatial neoliberal formation is important, as one key claim 
made here is that local political economic conditions, including the size of bailed fi-
nancial institutions, as well as high levels of elite integration, influenced framing 
strategy. The second section discusses framing theory. Framing theory highlights the 
strategic value of careful frame construction as a means to subtly shape and direct 
public discourse on an issue. The third section provides an outline of the methodolo-
gy used for data collection and content analysis, followed by a detailed presentation 
of findings. The last section concludes. 
 
2.  a case of neoliberalisation 
 No Irish government has openly adopted neoliberal ideology, however the 
development from the mid-twentieth century supports this claim. In assessing Ire-
across space. This is because an elite-driven project of extending free-market govern-
ance globally (Har
when particular economies undergo economic liberalisation (Brenner et al., 2010: 
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184). This results in local differentiation of neoliberal policies, which nonetheless are 
connected at the most general level with the universal goal of achieving  politically 
guided intensification of market  
 o-
ject and its local manifestation is a process-based analysis of neoliberalisation (Peck, 
Tickle, 2002). This approach regards neoliberalism as a never complete or stationary 
project, but rather one which is constantly evolving and reinventing itself in response 
to economic and political pressures. In view of this J. Peck and A. Tickle (2002) dis-
tinguish between the destructive and creative moments of neoliberalisation, charac-
- - r-
ticularly to the role of the neoliberal state which constantly reorganises itself to sim-
ultaneously interfere less and more in the economy. For example, the state interferes 
less when it reduces its regulatory responsibility in industries such as finance and 
cuts back on social spending, and interferes more when it provides special subsidies 
highlights multiple aspects that fit this neoliberal pattern. 
 For a number of decades after achieving formal independence in 1921, Ire-
-based 
(Ruane 2010). The first steps towards economic liberalisation occurred in 1956, when 
the Exports Profits Tax Relief Scheme was introduced. The scheme exempted profits 
derived from exports from all tax liabilities, and was particularly attractive to export-
orientated foreign manufacturing firms (Drudy, Collins, 2011: 339), so that in the fol-
lowing years a large number of firms from the UK, the USA and elsewhere set up 
operations in Ireland. Liberalisation continued apace, with Ireland joining the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World Bank in the late 1950s, signing a free-trade 
agreement with the UK in 1965, and joining the nascent European Economic Com-
munity (now E
Collins, 2011: 340). Such support was hardly surprising since economic growth aver-
aged 4% throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
 as a global 




The policy of liberalisation, however, remained a priority for the state, and growth 
returned with a bang between 1988 and 2007. During this period the economy 
boomed, averaging 6% annual growth in GDP, and a reduction in unemployment 
from 16% in 1994 to 4% in 2000 (Honohan 2010: 21). By the 2000s the Irish state found 
2000s. The model is built on three key features: an extensive reliance on foreign direct 
investment; the maintenance of a low tax regime to attract multinational corpora-
tions; and a market-friendly regulatory framework in key sectors such as banking 
(Kirby 2010: 91). 
 In line with the typical neoliberal pattern identified above the Irish model of 
goals of economic competitiveness over those of 
programmes remained comparatively low (Mercille 2014: 283). A final point of note 
2013), and the elite integration between politics and finance this has fostered, which 
ultimately w  
e-
velopment, the increasing power of the financial sector in the operation of the econ-
e-
where, this influence was used to promote deregulation of the financial sector, ulti-
mately leading to an extensive failure of the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Au-
thority to appropriately manage increasing risk-taking by Irish banks (Honohan 
2009). A number of analysts argue that connections between elites within the private 
banking sector and public sector regulatory bodies were the key reason for this fail-
ure (Ross 2009; Chari, Bernhagen, 2011). Ross highlights the close relationship, and 
high levels of elite integration, that existed between the banks and state apparatus 
when he explains that Central Bank directors had often moved comfortably on to the boards 
of commercial banks once their terms of office in the service of the state were over... At one 
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point the relationship between the regulator and the regulated was so close that there were 
instances of AIB and Bank of Ireland directors sitting simultaneously on the board of the Cen-
tral Bank (Ross, 2009: 70-71). 
whereby elites move between financial institutions and the state bodies charged with 
regulating them, creating an array of conflicting interests. This close relationship be-
tween elites would have also facilitated the ability of the financial sector to lobby the 
government for favourable policy.  
by Irish banks began to unwind (Honohan 2009: 208). As the extent of bad loans in 
the Irish system became apparent the government provided a blanket guarantee of 
2011: 475) to stabilise the economy. By early 2009 the first bank, Anglo Irish Bank, 
was nationalised, and by 2012 the Irish government effectively owned the formerly 
private financial sector, having nationalised Irish Nationwide Building Society, Al-
lied Irish Bank, Irish Life and Permanent, and EBS building society, as well as taking 
a large stake in Bank of Ireland.  
The cost to the taxpayer at this time was 64 billion EUR, or almost a quarter of 
gross domestic product for that year. To pay for this corporate welfare the Irish state 
had begun a neoliberal austerity programme in 2009 which included significant cuts 
in social spending. Ultimately the nationalisation programme was too costly for the 
state to bear, and in late 2010 the Irish state accepted an 85 billion EUR International 
Monetary Fund-
 
The question now begs itself, how did a pro-capitalist Irish government in 
a state that had long favoured market liberalisation convince its citizens that the solu-
market discipline run its course. This question has relevance for many political econ-
omies in which banks were bailed out during the Global Financial Crisis. A second 




c use of framing techniques were used to shape 
public debate. This strategy was facilitated by an uncritical corporate news media 
who failed to act in the public interest when reporting on the crisis. Data will be pre-
sented to support these claims in section four below. 
 
3. Theory and Method 
3.1. Framing Theory 
 The original groundwork for the concept of framing can be traced back to 
seminal works in both sociology (Goffman 1974) and psychology (Kahneman, 
Tversky, 1984), which respectively analysed the manner in which people make sense 
of reality and are cognitively affected by communication constructs. E. Goffman 
(1974) argues that because of the vast amounts of available data at a point in time, 
individuals must order this data into frames which emphasise some selected data at 
the expense of other data, so as to create a functional representation of reality. This 
influential insight is visible in later definitions of framing in media studies, with R-M. 
some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
-M. Entman (2007: 164) later fur-
elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections 
 on to note that effective 
frames typically perform some or all of the following four functions: problem defini-
tion, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion. This definition of 
framing is widely accepted within the field (Carragee, Roefs, 2004). 
o-
vide a problem definition and remedy promotion that was made into public policy. 
Importantly, rather than incorporate a moral judgement, these frames sought to neu-
tralise a moral critique of their suggested solution. For example, movements such as 
Occupy have highlighted the clear injustice in the socialisation of the losses of private 




are acting out of necessity rather than choice. Thus, we see an instance of what 
Mirowski (Es
n-
scious political choices of neoliberal governments and policy makers. In this case fi-
nancial losses become social, but profits remain private.  
For a frame to be an effective communication it must be applicable to the tar-
 in ongoing sense-making of the 
world, seeing the latter as a process that is always conditioned by past experiences 
and an interpretive schema built up during their life course. This inherited schema 
plays an important role in frame interpretation. For example, the cues which a frame 
provide will be amplified or negated depending on how applicable they are to an 
 
An example of how this works is a study which found that in a group of 
American respondents to a proposition allowing a hate group to hold a political ral-
104). This highlights that small changes in how an issue is framed can lead to large 
this effect when noting that 65% of the American public feel too little is being spent 
These examples highlight the fact that framing cues are most likely to have an effect 
if they are applicable to the interpretive horizon of a target audience. To elaborate, 
generalisations correlating with framing outcomes in both studies. 




pretive horizons of US citizens, as well as citizens of all developed capitalist states, 
due to the centrality of these institutions in economic live. For example, in advanced 
economies bank lending facilitates businesses in expanding, it allows consumers to 
spend future income on present needs such as housing, and education, finance sup-
ports government spending, and is used to invest savings for retirement (Goodhart 
2014: 19). Furthermore, in an era of corporate capitalism, advanced economies such 
as Ireland, are typically dominated by a small number of large financial institutions. 
 
3.2. Method and Data Collection 
This study utilised critical discourse analysis (CDA) methodology to conduct  
a qualitative content analysis of the mass media. CDA goes beyond descriptive anal-
ysis by looking for deeper meanings, patterns and effects stemming from social pow-
er differentials inherent in all discourse production, but which often remain hidden. 
meaning of qualitative material in a systemati
CDA considers all language use to be inherently political, and thus a factor in main-
taining and challenging existing power relations (Fairclough 2010).  
The Irish Times and the Irish Independent are the chosen sources due to their 
media (NewsBrands 2015). Furthermore, both newspapers dominate the ABC1 class 
of news readers. This grouping comprises the middle-classes, as well as those in pro-
fessional, administrative or managerial occupations, collectively constituting a politi-
Irish Times has been 
rime 
stature amongst media and political elites in Dublin city and county, a region which 
contrast, the Irish Independent has a more nationally spread readership (Brandenburg 
2005: 300). 
 Ideologically, the Irish Times 
Irish Independent 
regarded as ideologically centre-right (Corcoran 2004: 37). Although a note of caution 
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is that Ireland is generally considered to have no prominent ideological division, 
with national politics holding a relatively stable centre-right position. Perhaps of 
more significance are the contrasting ownership models of both papers. The Irish In-
dependent is owned by an internationally operating large media conglomeration, In-
dependent News and Media (INM), which owns over two hundred newspapers, 
over one hundred websites, and one hundred and thirty radio stations across Ireland, 
the UK, South Africa, India, Australia and New Zealand, generating revenues of half 
social elites, including Dermot Gleeson, a one-time chairman of Allied Irish Bank, 
 largest bank during the Celtic Tiger period, Brian Hillary, a former Director 
of the Central Bank and former parliamentarian, and B.E. Summers, a director of 
AIB. Consequently, INM, is a model of elite integration. 
 The Irish Times, while also following a business model, has some significant 
differences from the corporate-owned Irish Independent. Since 1974 the Irish Times has 
been run by a charitable trust, somewhat similar to the Guardian in the UK, formed to 
secure the organisation as an independent newspaper concerned with matters of 
1. This arrangement means that the newspaper is 
not under the same intensity of profit-maximisation pressure which a corporate 
newspaper is under (McMenamin et al., 2013: 173), although it is still a profit-
orientated entity. 
Data is collected using the LexisNexis news database to search for all articles 
which contained the phrases 
dates of 1 January 2006 and 30 June 2009 in the two newspapers above were searched 
allows verification whether t d-
scape where new terms appear in order to describe new situations, and which poten-
tially indicate strategic discursive activity. Since the first article returned is in late 
2008 it is clear that these frames are specific to the economic crisis of 2008 onwards. 
                                                          





This search returned twenty articles from the Irish Times, with the first article appear-
ing on the 1 October 2008; and returned eighteen from the Irish Independent, with the 
first appearing on 15 December 2008, giving a combined corpus of forty articles. 
 
4. Framing Bank Bailouts  Findings from Ireland 
4.1. The data set overview 
 The aim of this research is to critically assess the role of Irish corporate media 
in disseminating a particular framing of financially ruined banks during a crucial 
policy response to the drastic failure of its financial sector. With this in mind the 
analysis now turns to the master theme around which all other themes and sub-
themes make sense (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Thematic overview of study data set 
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4.2. Particular Financial Institutions are Essential to the Economy 
 The claim that particular financial institutions are of systemic importance, or 
essential, to economic recovery is the central theme which dominates the entire cor-
pus investigated here. This theme pervades both chosen media discourses as a form 
despite the fact that by stipulating bank bailouts the frame constitutes a radical nega-
tion of capitalist market discipline. This infers that failed businesses should be al-
lowed to fail so that more efficient and innovative businesses can take their place. 
n-
stitutes the nodal theme2 to which all other themes relate themselves to, and make 
sense of, as discursive responses to the crisis. The following quotes are examples of 
this radical, yet unquestioned, common sense claim of systemic importance as the 




 (Irish Times, December 2008). 
 
Here the government indicates that it will recapitalise some banks depending 
on their level of systemic importance to the economy. The criteria for such im-
portance, however, is not provided in this newspaper article, or indeed in any of the 
articles in the corpus. What is important here is that the government is setting the 
grounds for creating a dual economy. One part of the economy will continue to be 
governed by standard capitalist norms whereby market discipline applies to busi-
nesses and economic agents, while the other consists of systemically important finan-
cial institutions where market discipline will not be allowed to run its course, and 
instead socialist principles will be applied to nationalise private bank losses. This 
radical course of action is presented in normalising policy tones: 






It [the Government] added that taxpayers would be safeguarded and any investment would 
also be made on a non-
institution, the importance of maint  
 (Irish Independent, January 2009). 
The quote normalises the otherwise radical policy of socialisation of private 
losses by using language that simultaneously suppresses the socialist aspect and in-
vokes capitalist and democratic norms. This is done by invoking, in the first instance, 
good governance by stressing concern for protecting taxpayers, in the second in-
practice by emphasizing procedural equality through non-discrimination in deciding 
which bank is of systemic importance. The incumbent government reiterates its read-
iness to bailout some institutions throughout the research period: 
Mr Cowen [Irish Prime Minister of the time] said the Government was very much of the 
view that it stood ready to assist financial institutions of systemic importance.  
 (Irish Times, April 2009). 
 The policy is strategically framed so that the government draws upon a simple 
frame that implies necessity above all else, and ignores the socialisation of private 
losses that all bank bailouts involve. Other agents speaking on behalf of the private 
sector also apply this frame of necessity in an unproblematic way, despite its anti-
market implications:  
 [A. Hughes, chief economist with KBC Bank]. 
 (Irish Independent, June 2009). 
 
Here we see advocacy for bank bailouts from an orthodox economist without 
reflecting how this might impact on market efficiency, an issue which in other cir-
cumstances is the central factor against which major economic decisions are usually 
decided. The European Commission is another agency which lends it support to the 
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[referring to Ireland], it may be appropriate to 
focus asset-relief measures on a limited number of banks of systemic importance,  [EU 
Commission] said. 
 (Irish Independent, February 2009). 
 
- a-
ture of the policy being applied, since here asset-relief measures include the Irish 
state knowingly buying worthless assets from banks, l-
ance sheets. This discursive normalisation was carried out by various members of the 
i-
nanciers who were time and again able to articulate these frames through privileged 
access to media which fail to challenge the given narrative in the public interest. 
 
4.3. New crisis  new frames 
 Strategic frames come to light at specific times and in response to specific 
events. Interestingly in the Irish case the i-
cant
-economic geog-
raphy. First, there is a low level of critical deconstruction across both media sources 
of the manner in which both frames naturalise what should have been a highly con-
testable policy. A graphical overview of the corpus highlights this point in broad 
terms (figure 2). The majority of articles un-problematically accepted both frames. 
Although this statement should be qualified with acknowledgement of the various 
types of articles in any newspaper, including op-eds, analysis/comment, editorials 
and the ubiquitous report-style article, and the function each serves. Op-eds, analysis 
and editorial type articles have a clear and identifiable argumentative structure, and 
often with a first person positionality. The report-style articles which make up the 
bulk of broadsheet papers are positioned as neutral reflections of material events. 
These articles tend not to critically problematise their material, adding to their ap-









For example, only six articles problematised the frame of TBTF, and only one 
did so strongly. No articles problematised 
was the key frame used by Irish actors in relation to domestic institutions. Further-
more, no articles critically assessed the logic by which the Government made deci-
sions to label institutions as systemically important. In light of this, it is noteworthy 
that while both frames had a general prescription written into them, which was to 
the specific criteria of size inherent to 
other hand reveals almost nothing in terms of the criteria by which an institution is 
worthy of such a label, closing down space for debate or contestation. This point will 
be further analysed below, but first some data is presented to expand on the argu-
ment so far.  
i-
tially reported in the Irish Times in Oct 2008, not long after the Irish government had 
put in place a blanket guarantee of all deposits in domestic banks. The guarantee is 
designed to prevent a 
simultaneously from banks perceived to be in danger of collapse: 
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Had the Government not offered an unlimited guarantee, we may have seen over coming days 
a significant shift in the uncovered portion of these deposits from the private financial institu-
tions into An Post. Funds would also likely have moved from the smaller institutions to the 
two larger banks, Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland, which many perceive as being too big 
to fail.  (Irish Times, October 2008). 
nd in a 
normalizing manner, despite the radical anti-capitalist implications the frame entails. 
Thus a major disruption of the discursive landscape is naturalised through being 
embedded in a manner which uncritically accepts its validity. Other articles adopt  
a similar approach: 
The government and the Bundesbank have said that Hypo Real Estate, Germanys second-
biggest property lender, is too big to fail.  (Irish Times, October 2008). 
A paper by TCD economist Patrick Honohan on the banking crisis argued that capital injec-
tions in the banks were a prerequisite for recovery. The financial regulator needed to decide 
now which banks had systemic importance to the economy, in other words, are too big to fail, 
and which are zombie banks.  (Irish Times, January 2009). 
 
with the frame of systemic importance, whereby it is naturalised as a self-
explanato
problematise and challenge the policy it implies on practical, ethical and moral 
grounds. This includes questioning whether it is materially feasible to rescue failed 
large banks: 
Speaking at a function hosted by Northern Ireland property group Parker Green in Newry, 
Michael Gibbons, who is BNP's [French bank] head of distressed debt trading, cautioned 
.  (Irish Independent, Janu-
ary 2009). 
Paradoxically, this banker poses a critique of the policy of bank bailouts on the 
grounds of cost, rather than for its anti-capitalist implications. Other actors raise the 




take exorbitant risks in the knowledge that they will be saved from their self-inflicted 
failure by the state: 
While cautioning that not all banks are rotten, Galbraith [economist] says no bank should be 
 also being allowed to take risks.  (Irish Independent, June 
2009). 
He [C. McCreevy, former Irish minister for finance] said the concept of banks be-
y-
e  (Irish Independent, Jun 09) 
A third axis of critique relates to the fundamental impropriety of classing a bank as 
 
nor can we get into this notion that a bank is too big to fail, he [R. Bruton, finance 
spokesperson for Fine Gael, the main opposition party of the time] said.  (Irish Times, 
May 2009). 
Consequently, for practical and ethical reasons, as well as the capitalist logic of 
moral hazard there are major openings for critique and debate in relation to the 
frame TBTF. Yet in a corpus of thirty nine articles these points are largely made in 
passing, and only the final article quoted above contains a direct challenge to the idea 
that financial institutions are too big to fail. Importantly, in light of the fact that the 
n Irish political articulations 
justifying financial bail-outs, this concept is not problematised at all. Instead it ap-
pears as
to being given different meanings in multiple si
 
 
it becomes applicable to a given bank, and can be foregrounded by contrasting this to 
n-
herently digital framing of a financial institution, in the sense that it implies a clear 
positive or negative status based on a single attribute: size. Once agreement is found 
on what size an institution must be to count as being too big to fail, say by ranking 
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whether a bank is too big to fail. An analogue frame is less clear cut, substituting
 a general set of criteria for a precise set of criteria, making assessment far more com-
plex. 
 
of what makes a bank systemically important. Is it size alone, or is it a specific func-
tion? Without clear guidelines on this, it becomes difficult, or even impossible, for the 
m-
 political strategy to negate public dissent against Gov-
ernment support for systematically unimportant small banks: 
As far as the Government is concerned, this is the recapitalisation of the two main financial 
institutions which are of such systemic importance for Ireland, said Mr Lenihan. (Irish 
Times, February 2009, emphasis added). 
Here the government is being explicitly vague, as discussed above. No criteria 
is provided to the public regarding what features makes a bank systemically im-
portant, and yet as the government clearly indicates, banks can be more or less sys-
temically important, and still be provided with state aid. The Government continues 
with such ambiguity, stating: 
-- in terms of 
their borrowing and deposits -- that they are of systemic importance to our economy and it's 
 [Minister for 
Finance] said.  (Irish Independent, December 2008). 
However, the level of borrowings and deposits required to be considered sys-
tematically important is never given. Furthermore, the argument made here that the 
in one article in the Irish Times: 
The problem, as Hughes [chief economist at KBC Bank in 2009] points out, is that from 
here on in there will be all sorts of institutions which, finding themselves in trouble, will 
claim to be of systemic importance to either a country's or the global economy.  (Irish Times, 
June 2009). 
Unfortunately, neither media studied here developed this line of argument. To 




es were utilised 
with a specific purpose in mind, namely to convince citizens living in a neoliberal 
hegemony to accept an anti-capitalist socialisation of private losses. Despite this con-
tradiction both media sources accepted these frames as self-explanatory common 
sense. 
4.4. Size matters 
 As has been noted above there are usually important reasons why a particular 
n-
utional elites in Ireland is note-
frame in the Anglo-Saxon world, as it has been used extensively in the US since the 
1980s, and appears in numerous popular and academic publications (for example 
Gup 2004; Stern, Feldman, 2004; Santos 2014). Part of the answer in this case relates 
m-
ifier. It was widely considered 
during the crisis that only two banks were big enough relative to the Irish economy 
il-led government known to 
have extensive political and financial connections with small banks such as Anglo 
quently utilising the 
i-
cally advantageous. An analysis of data which supports the above reading of the size 
of Irish financials in relation to the economy is presented below. 
A. Ahearne, an Irish economist, suggested early in the crisis that winding up 
loss-making Anglo Irish Bank rather than providing public funds would: 
Allow the Government to concentrate on strengthening AIB [Allied Irish Bank] and Bank 
of Ireland, two institutions that are without doubt of systemic importance, (Irish In-
dependent, January 2009). 
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This view that only AIB and Bank of Ireland were too big to fail was reiterated 
by the government opposition Labour party spokesperson for finance Joan Burton, 
who stated: 
[A] Bill to nationalise Anglo Irish Bank the Minister is missing the main point. The big issue 
is the protection, sustainability and regulation of our two large banks [referring to AIB and 
BOI]. (Irish Times, January 2009). 
Similarly, twenty leading domestic economists who wrote an Opinion piece in 
the Irish Times 
would acquire non-performing loans from banks considered too big to fail, are clear 
that in Ireland only two banks fit the category of systemic importance: 
Take our two leading banks, AIB and Bank of Ireland. Analysts have repeatedly estimated the 
extent of bad loans at these banks to be of the order of at least 20 billion EUR.  (Irish Times, 
April 2009). 
An article report 
more bank which had a nationwide presence, Permanent TSB: 
The three other public banks - AIB, Bank of Ireland and Permanent TSB - outperformed An-
glo, as investors noted the Government said it would assess recapitalisation proposals on 
 case-by-  (Irish 
Times, December 2009). 
This article makes clear that market investors did not regard Anglo as a sys-
temically important bank. However, an Irish Government well-connected with bank-
Bernhagen, 2011; Taylor 2011) was determined to recapitalise Anglo Irish Bank. For 
this reason Government actors consistently favoured the more ambiguous signifier 
 not to focus attention on size: 
He [B. Cowen, Prime Minister] v-
the basis that the institution was of systemic importance to the Irish banking system.  (Irish 




Brian Cowen signalled yesterday that loss-making Irish Nationwide would not be allowed to 
fail and would be propped up by the State if required.  (Irish Independent, April 2009). 
 Other actors with vested interests are given media access to support the gov-
 
Allowing Irish Nationwide to collapse would be the wrong decision and one that would haunt 
the country for years to come, EBS [an Irish financial institution] chief executive Fergus 
Murphy has warned.  (Irish Independent, May 2009). 
 To conclude, this section highlights the fact that both newspapers fail to ques-
tion the framing of smaller institutions as systemically important, despite this mean-
ing they would in effect be treated as if they were too big to fail. Since contemporary 
awareness of framing effects, it is unlikely that there was no realisation of the subtle 
variations in cogni
to failed, but not very big, Irish institutions is significant. 
 
and Anglo Irish Bank 
 By the end of 2010 the Irish state had conducted one of the costliest bank 
bailouts in history relative to national income. The state had transferred 65 billion 
EUR of public money to banks through purchasing their non-performing loans, with 
a further 35 billion EUR set aside for 2011 (Drudy, Collins, 2011: 345). Anglo Irish 
Bank had by this time received 28.4 EUR billion, the largest amount of all bailed-out 
Irish banks (Kitchin et al., 2012: 1318) despite being relatively unimportant to the 
d-
er, with much of this lending occurring overseas in the United States. This fact was 
known by both media studied here. For example, in December 2008 it is reported in 
three separate Irish Times y-
ing it is not a bank of significance to the national economy during the present crisis: 
Anglo is regarded as a specialist property lender, while the other three banks [AIB, BOI and 
Permanent TSB] have wider businesses, controlling 57[%]of the Irish mortgage market. 
 (Irish Times, December 2008). 
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Anglo, a specialist property lender, dropped 4.5 while the three other lenders with tenta-
cles reaching into wider parts of the economy outperformed the bank. (Irish Times, December 
2008). 
The three other public banks  AIB, Bank of Ireland and Permanent TSB  outperformed An-
glo, as investors noted the Government said it would assess recapitalisation proposals on 
 case-by-
regarded as a specialist lender to the property market, while the other quoted banks have much 
wider businesses affecting the broader economy. (Irish Times, December 2008). 
 The Irish Independent in contrast does not report that Anglo is primarily a spe-
cialist property lender, instead reproducing the dominant view of the bank presented 
by political actors: 
the capital needs of An-
glo Irish Bank on appropriate terms and to ensure its long-term strength and viability as 
a . (Irish Independent, December 2008). 
 As a consequence of these two conflicting positions in December 2008 the 
m-
Irish Times articles, while in the same month the Irish Inde-
pendent 
means the Government has to repeatedly rebut claims that Anglo is not a legitimate 
bailout candidate: 
He [B. Cowen] [1.5 billion 
EUR] recapitalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and defended the decision on the basis that the in-
stitution was of systemic importance to the Irish banking system. (Irish Times, January 
2009). 
now State-owned bank to restructure and to cut debts. (Irish Independent, June 2009). 
 In discursively constructing Anglo as being of systemic importance to the 
economy government actors aim to create what J. Torfing (1999: 300-301) describes as 




of equivalence. Likewise, a logic of difference is an articulation which links signs 
the 
above logic of equivalence is below expressed as a logic of difference that serves to 
 
Anglo Irish is poisoning the banking system and is of no systemic importance. It must not be 
nationalised; it must be allowed to collapse and with it the developers at the heart of the prob-
lem, writes Morgan Kelly [economist],. (Irish Times, January 2009). 
 
important are less forcefully constructed by political opposition leaders: 
Former Labour leader Pat Rabbitte questioned the systemic importance of Anglo Irish Bank, 
which was one branch with three or four offices. (Irish Times, January 2009). 
As Mr Bruton [Government opposition] pointed out, Anglo is not of systemic importance 
to the Irish banking system. It has only one branch outlet in Dublin. How can anyone argue 
that a bank with one branch in the capital city is of systemic importance?  (Irish Independent, 
June 2009). 
Both of these quotes question the systemic importance of Anglo due to its 
small size and limited number of retail branches nationally, highlighting the fact that 
However, as a specialist property lender the bank had become very important to 
-connected property developers,  
a fact that the Government was continually pressed to deny: 
He [B. Lenihan, finance minister] said the bailout of Anglo wa
. 
(Irish Times, December 2009). 
 The most forceful accusation of political cronyism involving Anglo Irish Bank 
was reported in the Irish Times
m-
represented: 




The reality is that Anglo has no importance in the Irish financial system. It existed purely as 
a vehicle for a few politically connected individuals to place reckless bets on the commercial 
property market. These property speculators may be of systemic importance to the finances of 
. (Irish Times, January 2009). 
 
2002: 27), a discursive terrain where related but competing articulations attempt to 
exclude discursive meanings through the fixing of signs as moments. It is precisely 
through such contests that the structure of meaning of a given discursive totality, or 
parts thereof, becomes unstructured, creating space for new meanings to emerge. The 
mass media have are highly influential organizations in deciding how such contests 
play out and shape public discourse.  
Social power can provide privileged access to media resources. In this case the 
Irish government and other financial actors were given access to the media studied 
here in order to frame Anglo as systemically important to the Irish economy, while 
others who contested such a framing were given less prominence. Within the corpus 
investigated here the Irish Independent appears to uncritically follow this elite-driven 
consensus, while the Irish Times 
important to the economy. For example the former contains nine articles which sup-
port the government consensus on Anglo and two which contest it, while the latter 
has five articles in favour and three against. Overall, however, the dominant consen-
sus presented in both media is one that supports the official framing of the bank, if to 
different degrees across both sources. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This study has highlighted two key findings. The first highlights the strategic 




did not become the dominant frame in public discourse in Ireland. This is because 
the frame was not applicable to the bailout policy which the Irish Government im-
plemented during 2008/2009. This policy included bailing out multiple small finan-
cial institutions wh
recognition of local political economic conditions an Irish Government known to 
promote financial sector inte m-
n-
that specifying clear criteria as to why this should be the case. The vague nature of 
of which institutions to bail out more difficult. Thus, framing strategy was utilised 
strategically to shaping public discour  
The second finding relates to the first. This study shows a considerable prefer-
ence by two leading Irish news organisations to uncritically reproduce the Govern-
particular, it was known that Anglo 
Irish Bank, the bank that received the largest state-funded bailout, was a specialist 
property lender and should therefore not be considered too big to fail. The Irish Times 
reported as much in December 2008, before the Government had made clear that it 
considered Anglo and other small institutions as systemically important to the econ-
omy. When these arguments were made, neither media made any significant effort to 
g D. Edwards and  
disseminating interpretations of events that conform to the priorities and aims of 
Western political and business elites. 
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